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Abstract Three commitments guide Dennett’s approach to the study of conscious-
ness. First, an ontological commitment to materialist monism. Second, a method-
ological commitment to what he calls ‘heterophenomenology.’ Third, a ‘doxological’
commitment that can be expressed as the view that there is no room for a distinction
between a subject’s beliefs about how things seem to her and what things actually
seem to her, or, to put it otherwise, as the view that there is no room for a reality/
appearance distinction for consciousness. We investigate how Dennett’s third
doxological commitment relates to his first two commitments and whether its
acceptance should be seen as a mere logical consequence of acceptance of the first
two. We will argue that this is not the case, that Dennett’s doxological commitment is
in need of independent motivation, and that this independent motivation is not
forthcoming.
Key words consciousness . monism . heterophenomenology . belief .
doxological commitment
Three commitments at least appear to be guiding Dennett’s approach to the study of
consciousness. First, an ontological commitment to materialist monism. Second, a
methodological commitment to what he calls ‘heterophenomenology.’ Third, a
‘doxological’ commitment that can be expressed as the view that there is no room
for a distinction between a subject’s beliefs about how things seem to her and what
things actually seem to her, or, to put it otherwise, as the view that there is no room
for a reality/appearance distinction for consciousness.
Our main aim will be to investigate how Dennett’s third doxological commitment
relates to his first two commitments and whether its acceptance should be seen as a
Phenom Cogn Sci (2007) 6:185–200
DOI 10.1007/s11097-006-9036-9
J. Dokic (*) : E. Pacherie
Institut Jean-Nicod CNRS-EHESS-ENS, 1 bis, avenue de Lowendal, 75007 Paris, France
e-mail: dokic@ehess.fr
E. Pacherie
e-mail: pacherie@ens.fr
mere logical consequence of acceptance of the first two. We will argue that this is
not the case, that Dennett’s doxological commitment is in need of independent
motivation, and that this independent motivation is not forthcoming. More
specifically, we will argue that there is more to the conscious content of perceptual
experience than what transpires in a subject’s phenomenal beliefs.1 We will develop
two lines of arguments. First, as Marcel (2003) has shown, a distinction of levels of
awareness is needed to account for both the relations and distinctions between
various pathologies of perceptual consciousness. Second, there is a sense in which
perceptual experience has nonconceptual content and this content cannot be fully
captured in terms of beliefs the subject has or could have. We will argue that positing
the existence of this nonconceptual content is perfectly compatible with a
methodological commitment to heterophenomenology, that is, the presence of this
non-conceptual content is assessable using heterophenomenological methods.
Finally, we will show that one can acknowledge the existence of nonconceptual
content without fear of thereby smuggling dualism back into the picture.
In the first section, we will say more about what Dennett’s three commitments
involve and how they relate. In the second section, we will discuss Marcel’s
distinction between visual phenomenology and awareness thereof and show its
relevance to an evaluation of Dennett’s doxological commitment. In the third section
we will try to motivate a distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual contents
and to show that this distinction leads in turn to a distinction between experience and
beliefs about experience. Some of the arguments that have been adduced in favor of
the distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual content may not pass muster
when subjected to the strictures of the heterophenomenological method. Others,
however, do, or so we will argue. Similarly, some ways of conceiving of the contents
of perceptual experience may indeed smack of dualism, but others are unobjection-
able in that respect.
Dennett’s three commitments
Dennett’s commitment to materialism is a commitment to the view that there is only
one sort of stuff, namely matter, or, to put it otherwise, whatever entities and
processes are studied by physics, chemistry and biology, and that the mind is no
exception and is ultimately nothing but a physical phenomenon. This commitment is
shared by many philosophers and scientists today, at least up to a point. Some people
are happy to consider that most mental processes are indeed physical processes but
have qualms when it comes to consciousness. More precisely, using Block’s
distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness, they tend
to agree that access consciousness falls within the purview of materialism, but they
stop short at phenomenal consciousness. This reluctance takes several forms. One
can accept, as Nagel does, that physicalism about conscious experience might be
true, but claim that so far “we do not have the beginning of concept of how it might
be true” (Nagel, 1974, p. 447). One can pay even more perfunctory lip-service to
1 Here and in the remainder of this paper, we use the phrase ‘phenomenal beliefs’ to refer to the subjective
beliefs a subject has about how things seem to her.
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materialism by arguing that, although consciousness is part of the natural realm, our
chances of ever understanding how it can be are about the same as the chances of
monkeys coming to grasp the principles of quantum physics (McGinn, 1989). Still
others think that conscious experience cannot in principle be accounted for in
materialistic terms and see this as a vindication of dualism (Chalmers, 1996).2
Dennett will have none of this. His is a dye-hard materialism meant to embrace all
aspects of the mental, including consciousness in all its forms. Indeed for him, if
dualism is the best we can do, then any hope we may have of understanding
consciousness is forlorn, but as he says, “such defeatism, today, in the midst of a
cornucopia of scientific advances ready to be exploited, strikes me as ludicrous, even
pathetic” (Dennett, 1991, p. 40). Although we have reservations about some aspects
of Dennett’s own theory of consciousness, we certainly agree with him that it is
more than premature to forfeit materialism about consciousness. Thus, nothing we
will say in defense of the existence of perceptual experience as distinct from
phenomenal beliefs should conflict with a commitment to materialism.
Dennett’s second commitment is a commitment to the method of heteropheno-
menology. Heterophenomenology is intended as “the neutral path leading from
objective physical science and its insistence on the third-person point of view, to a
method of phenomenological description that can (in principle) do justice to the most
private and ineffable subjective experiences, while never abandoning the method-
ological principles of science” (Dennett, 1991, p. 72). The two main tenets of this
methodology are the adoption of a third-person point of view and the adoption of a
neutral stance towards the assertions of the subjects. It is, Dennett insists, nothing
more than the standard third-person scientific method applied to the particular realm
of phenomena of consciousness. This method involves three main steps. The first
step involves recording raw data: verbal reports, button-pushings, eye blinks, as well
as all other manifestations of belief, conviction, expectation, emotion, etc, including
behavioral responses, brain activities, visceral reactions, hormonal reactions, and
other changes in internal states that are detectable by objective means. The second
step involves moving from raw data to interpreted data. In the case of verbal reports
this means moving from vocal sounds to speech acts, which, assuming the
heterophenomenologist has no reason to doubt the sincerity of the subjects, are
treated as expressions of their beliefs about their experiences.
The neutrality or agnosticism of heterophenomenology resides in the fact that “the
heterophenomenological method neither challenges nor accepts as entirely true the
assertions of subjects, but rather maintains a constructive and sympathetic neutrality,
in the hopes of compiling a definitive description of the world according to the
subjects” (Dennett, 1991, p. 83). This definitive description constitutes a description
of the heterophenomenological world of the subject.
This initial bracketing for neutrality of the subject’s phenomenal beliefs is
required, according to Dennett (2001), because of two failures of overlap, which he
labels false positives and false negatives. On the one hand, some beliefs that subjects
have about their own conscious states are provably false. For instance, many people
think, wrongly, that their visual experience presents them with a detailed picture-like
2 Note though that this dualism is more limited in scope than classical Cartesian dualism as it applies only
to the phenomenal aspects of mental life.
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representation of the world, with high-resolution and uniformly rich detail from the
center out to the periphery.3 On the other hand, “some psychological things that
happen in people [...] are unsuspected by those people.” For instance, on priming
experiments using masking, subjects may be unable to report a masked prime and
yet it can be demonstrated that their performance was influenced by the prime.
The neutral stance is, however, only a temporary tactic. The third and final step in
the inquiry consists in investigating whether the subject’s beliefs can be confirmed or
not. According to Dennett, there are three main types of results this enquiry may
yield:
Often, indeed typically or normally, the existence of a belief is explained by
confirming that it is a true belief provoked by the normal operation of the
relevant sensory, perceptual, or introspective systems. Less often, beliefs can be
seen to be true only under some arguable metaphorical interpretation – the
subject claims to have manipulated a mental image, and we’ve found a quasi-
imagistic process in his brain that can support that claim, if it is interpreted
metaphorically. Less often still, the existence of beliefs is explainable by
showing how they are illusory byproducts of the brain’s activities: it only seems
to subjects that they are reliving an experience they’ve experienced before (déja
vu) Dennett (2001, p. 2).
Thus, a phenomenal belief may be true, metaphorically true, or plainly false or
illusory. One natural way to construe these three possibilities is as follows. A given
phenomenal belief is: (1) true, if the subject’s has or had the experience that he
believes he had and the experience constitutes the basis for the belief; (2)
metaphorically true, if the subject had an experience that, under some metaphorical
interpretation, fits the content of the belief; or (3) false, when instead of being based
on an experience with a corresponding content, it is an accidental by-product of the
brain’s activities. It is what Dennett seems to be saying in the above quoted passage.
It is also, we think, what he should say. But is it what he really means to say?
Turning now, to his doxological commitment, we will see that this is far from
obvious.
Towards the end of chapter 4 of Consciousness Explained, when giving a
summary of the heterophenomenological method he spent the chapter explaining,
Dennett writes: “we are giving you [the subject] total, dictatorial authority over the
account of how it seems to you, about what it is like to be you” (Dennett, 1991, p.
96). Here, the subject’s beliefs about what it is like to be her are suddenly equated
with what it is actually like to be her. On first reading this passage, a charitable
reader would suppose it is a slip of the pen, for how could our phenomenal beliefs
ever be false, as Dennett insists they can be, if they were, so to speak, constitutive of
the reality they are supposed to be about? Yet, this strange assertion can’t be blamed
on a momentary lapse of attention. For one thing, Dennett is happy to quote this
passage in several of his later writings.4 For another, in chapter 5 of Consciousness
3 However, see Noë (2004, Ch. 2) for reservations about whether people really have such a belief.
4 For instance, Dennett (2001, 2003, 2005).
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Explained, Dennett makes it crystal clear that this is what he actually means, saying
for instance:
Postulating a “real seeming” in addition to the judging or “taking” expressed in
the subject’s report is multiplying entities beyond necessity. Worse, it is
multiplying entities beyond possibility; the sort of inner presentation in which
real seemings happen is a hopeless metaphysical dodge, a way of trying to have
your cake and eat it too, especially since those who are inclined to talk this way
are eager to insist that this inner presentation does not occur in some
mysterious, dualistic sort of space perfused with Cartesian ghost-ether (Dennett,
1991, p. 134).
What we call Dennett’s doxological commitment is indeed a commitment to the
claim that there is no room for a distinction between what you believe it is like to be
you and what it is really like to be you – or more generally that there is no such thing
as an appearance/reality distinction for consciousness. As Schwitzgebel (this issue)
forcefully argues, there is, to put it mildly, a tension between this claim and
Dennett’s other claim, used to motivate the neutrality of the heterophenomenological
method, that we can be mistaken about our conscious experience.
The best way to bring out the tension between these claims is to draw a threefold
distinction between:
(1) A belief that one has an experience of type 8φ
(2) A seeming to have an experience of type 8φ
(3) A conscious experience of type 8φ
Here, type 8φcan include both aspects of the content of the experience and other
(perhaps qualitative) aspects of the experience itself. Both (2) and (3) are seemings.
Whereas (3) typically describes an experience whose content is entirely about the
world, (2) describes a second-order experience whose content includes in addition
the fact that one has the first-order experience. Now Dennett could be interpreted as
meaning that there’s no room for a distinction between (1) and (2): seeming to have
an experience is just having the belief that one has this experience. This would be his
doxological commitment. On the other hand, keeping (1) and (2) distinct from (3)
would allow him to maintain that we can be mistaken about our conscious
experience. It is debatable whether (1) and (2) should be identified, but at least under
this charitable interpretation, Dennett’s position could be exonerated from the charge
of downright self-contradiction.
Unfortunately, there’s no evidence that this is the view he holds and there is some
evidence that he would not accept this interpretation. For keeping (1) and (2) distinct
from (3) seems to re-introduce some appearance/reality distinction for conscious-
ness, something Dennett rejects. The passage quoted above suggests that for Dennett
accepting an appearance/reality distinction for consciousness would ineluctably
reinstate a form of dualism. So it would go against his ontological commitment to
materialism. But is it so? Dennett seems to assume that accepting in one’s mental
ontology not just beliefs about experiences but also experiences involves committing
oneself to the existence of such dubious entities as “sense data,” “sensations,” “raw
feels,” etc. But this is unwarranted. There have been several attempts by philosophers
strongly committed to naturalism such as Tye (1995) and Dretske (1995) to develop
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purely representational theories of experiential states. In particular, Dretske’s
distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic seeing can readily be interpreted
as a form of the distinction between conscious experience and belief about conscious
experience. Whatever objections one may have against these representational
theories – and most of them have been voiced by qualophiles, not exactly Dennett’s
bedfellows – it is difficult to accuse them of succumbing to dualism.
Another reason Dennett advances against an appearance/reality distinction for
consciousness is that this would open the possibility that some of your conscious
experiences occur unbeknownst to you, reality without appearance so to speak.
However, Dennett points out, such conscious experiences would be inaccessible
both from the first-person point of view and from the third person point of view. But
then, “putative facts about consciousness that swim out of reach of both ‘outside’
and ‘inside’ observers are strange facts indeed” (Dennett, 1991, p. 133). Whence
Dennett’s ‘first-person operationalism’:
We might classify the Multiple Draft model, then, as first-person operation-
alism, for it brusquely denies the possibility in principle of consciousness of a
stimulus in the absence of the subject’s belief in that consciousness (Dennett,
1991, p. 132).
In a nutshell, if a purportedly conscious state is neither accessible from the inside
nor from the outside, how are we to distinguish it from an unconscious state? This is
indeed the brunt of Dennett’s objection to Dretske’s talk of non-epistemic seeing.
Dretske needs a difference that makes a difference between non-epistemic seeing
which counts as visual experience and unconscious visual information which
doesn’t. According to Dennett, Dretske doesn’t provide it, and he can’t provide it
because it doesn’t exist.
On our reading, Dennett’s doxological commitment equates what it is like to be us
with what we believe it is like. Perhaps Dennett might prefer weaker versions of the
commitment. For instance, one might claim that one cannot consciously experience a
stimulus without believing that one is so conscious (first-order operationalism), but
deny that merely believing that one has certain conscious experience implies having
the experience itself. This would give one limited authority: in the presence of a
conscious experience, one’s beliefs about it cannot be but true, although other beliefs
about what one experiences can be false.
On another version, ordinary beliefs about experience are fallible only in the
sense that they embody a mistaken conception about what experience is. These
beliefs picture experience as a mental state distinct from belief, which it is not. This
is compatible with first-person operationalism and with some form of authority, for
instance over the contents of one’s first-order beliefs. Yet another version restricts
dictatorial authority to what our second-order beliefs about our experience are,
independently of whether they are true or false, thus leaving room for the claim that
introspection is fallible.5
5 Here we are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out these last two readings of Dennett’s
position.
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We cannot here argue in detail against each of these versions. Let us say that we
doubt that any of them is a faithful representation of what Dennett means. Briefly,
the first version does not motivate the required epistemological notion of authority,
since the subject would still be unable to distinguish, among her second-order
beliefs, those that are associated with real first-order experiences. The second and the
third versions considerably weaken Dennett’s radical claims about, respectively,
fallibilism about introspection and first-order operationalism. Fallibilism about mode
does not seem to capture what Dennett has in mind when he says that our
introspective beliefs about our experience are highly fallible. When I mistakenly
think that my visual experience presents me with a detailed picture-like
representation of the world, it seems I am wrong about the content of my visual
experience not just its mode. On the third version we considered, first-person
operationalism would be restricted to second-order beliefs. But why should we have
dictatorial authority over what our second-order beliefs are but not over our first-
order beliefs?
In what follows, we offer two different lines of arguments which directly attack
Dennett’s doxological commitment, by motivating a distinction between conscious
experience and belief about such experience. These arguments show that what it is
like cannot be (or at least cannot be fully) constituted by what the subject believes it
is like.
Pathologies of perceptual consciousness
Not all cognitive scientists – not to mention philosophers – are of Dennett’s
conviction that a difference that makes a difference between unconscious states,
conscious experiences and phenomenal beliefs is out of reach of third-person
scientific methodology. First, as Dennett rightly emphasizes, heterophenomenology
gives us much more data than just the subject’s verbal reports; behavioral responses
as well as all the covert, internal reactions that can be detected are part of the data.
Second, inference to the best explanation is part of the scientific toolkit. Black holes
are not among the data of science, yet we have good reasons to infer their existence.
Marcel (2003) provides an elegant illustration of how this could apply to the
study of consciousness. Marcel argues in favor of a distinction between phenomenal
experience and awareness of phenomenal experience (i.e., phenomenal belief,
according to the terminology used here). Among his arguments for this distinction is
the following, which is worth quoting at length:
This distinction is also illustrated by and explains the separate occurrence of
blindsight (loss of conscious visual experience with preserved nonconscious
vision), Anton’s syndrome (unawareness of blindness), and Anton’s syndrome
with bilateral blindsight [...]. Blindsight patients have normal access to their
visual experience, which in their case is absent in the scotomic area, which is
why they deny seeing; yet they are shown to have nonconscious vision by
accuracy of guessing [...]. In Anton’s syndrome unawareness of blindsight is
plausibly due to lack of access to absent visual experience. In the third case, a
patient assessed as totally bilaterally blind after traumatic impaction of the
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occipital poles was unaware of his blindness for 7 months. Yet during this time
his ability to point to light targets and guess luminance levels correctly and
other indirect tests all indicated blindsight, i.e., nonconscious vision without
visual phenomenology. Apparently, he lacked access to the latter’s absence. The
difference between blindsight and unawareness of blindness appears to be in
one’s awareness of visual phenomenology or its loss. The presence of these
three conditions and normal vision suggests a dissociation between noncon-
scious vision, visual phenomenology, and awareness of the latter (Marcel, 2003,
p. 173).
If Marcel is right, we should abandon Dennett’s doxological commitment. For
instance, the phenomenal belief that one does not see is not constitutive of the fact
that one does not see. Patients with Anton’s syndrome form the belief that they do
not see, but this belief is not based on genuine access to a first-order (lack of)
experience. It is disconnected from the first-order level and thus cannot be
constitutive of it.
Marcel’s data are impeccably heterophenomenological, consisting of the verbal
reports of the patients, their behavioral responses to various tests, and data on their
brain conditions and activities. The distinction between nonconscious vision, visual
experience and awareness of visual experience is the product of an inference to the
best explanation. We need this distinction, Marcel argues, in order to make sense of
the difference between the three conditions that are blindsight, Anton’s syndrome,
and Anton’s syndrome with blindsight. This distinction also does useful work in
accounting for other phenomena, such as the split awareness of sensation that can be
observed in anosognosia for hemiplegia, in the ‘hidden observer’ phenomenon in
hypnosis or in general anesthesia induced by centrally acting analgesics. Thus, the
distinction has substantial explanatory power. In other words, what we have here is a
difference arrived at using data and a mode of reasoning that are perfectly in line
with the dictates of the heterophenomenological method. Moreover, it is a difference
that makes a difference. What more could Dennett want?
Of course, Dennett could argue that since it is arrived at through a method of
inference to the best explanation, it might one day be superseded by another better
and more parsimonious explanation. Granted, but given that the distinction is arrived
at by scientifically sound means and that so far we have no better alternative
explanation, surely it should be provisionally accepted in the same way that, barring
new evidence or a better explanation not yet in, astrophysicists accept the existence
of black holes. Since Marcel’s form of theorizing does not infringe the principles of
heterophenomenology, Dennett’s fallback line of resistance may be that his
theorizing commits Marcel to the existence of entities of dubious metaphysical
standing and thus runs against an ontological commitment to materialism. But once
again, this is unwarranted. Nothing in what Marcel says commits him to the
existence of sense data and the like.
So, how does Dennett’s doxological commitment relate to his ontological and
methodological commitments? It seems pretty obvious that it not a direct
consequence of either commitment. As we have seen, it certainly doesn’t square
well with the motivation Dennett gives for the neutrality of heterophenomenology,
namely that we can be mistaken about our conscious experience and often are. In
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addition, as our discussion of Marcel’s arguments for a distinction between
phenomenal experience and awareness of phenomenal experience shows, one can
be faithful to both materialism and heterophenomenology while eschewing Dennett’s
doxological commitment. Rather, it seems that Dennett’s doxological commitment is
tied to acceptance of the Multiple Draft model of consciousness. Indeed, in one of
the quotes given above, Dennett admits as much when he says that the Multiple
Draft model is a form of first-person operationalism that denies the possibility in
principle of consciousness of a stimulus in the absence of the subject’s belief in that
consciousness. But this model is intended as an empirical theory of consciousness, a
theory whose value lies in part in its empirical adequacy. If the model cannot make
sense of differences that make a difference, then surely there is something wrong
with its empirical adequacy.
Belief and experience
In an exchange with Dennett (reported in Dennett, 2001), Goldman summarizes one
of their main points of disagreement as follows:
I realize that a ‘doxological’ (or representational) reductionist like yourself will
want to reduce feeling states to dispositions-to-believe. A resistor like myself
need not deny, of course, that feeling states do have a tendency to produce
beliefs. The question is whether there are ‘categorical’ features of feeling states
in virtue of which they have that tendency, or whether they are just pure
doxological tendency and nothing else. I find the former view more compelling,
and don’t think that representational reductionism will work across the board
(Goldman, quoted in Dennett, 2001, p. 10).
Along with Goldman, we think it unlikely that feeling states (i.e., conscious
experiences) reduce to dispositions-to-believe. Unlike Goldman, however, we would
not equate ‘doxological’ reductionism with representational reductionism, for we
think one can be a representational reductionist without being a doxological
reductionist. Indeed, our aim in this section is to motivate a distinction between
experience and phenomenal belief that hinges on differences in types of content.
More specifically, we will argue that the content of perceptual experiences, although
representational, is not fully conceptual or conceptualizable; instead it is non-
conceptual. Furthermore, we will argue that some of the empirical arguments that
have been adduced in favor of the idea that perception has non-conceptual content
are perfectly kosher with respect to the methodological precepts of heterophenome-
nology, relying not on questionable intuitions but on differences between recogni-
tional and discriminative capacities that are detectable by objective means.
For a start, let us state some rather obvious facts about the links between beliefs
and concepts. Although hardcore realists about propositional attitudes and moderate
realists like Dennett have serious disagreements about their ontological status, they
at least share the view that it only makes sense to attribute propositional states,
including beliefs, to a system insofar as by so doing we can explain and predict its
behavior. In other words, if it didn’t have some explanatory or predictive leverage,
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the practice of attribution would be purely gratuitous. Now the practice of attribution
can only have such explanatory or predictive leverage if the transitions between
attitudes are rational transitions and transitions between propositional attitudes are
rational insofar as they are content-dependent.
What needs explaining is how these transitions can be content-dependent. This is
where concepts step in: the content of a propositional state is a function of its
conceptual constituents and the rational transitions between propositional contents
are in turn a function of their conceptual constituents. As Crane (1992) aptly puts it,
concepts are the inferentially relevant constituents of intentional states, they account
for the inferential relations among beliefs and more generally, among propositional
attitudes. To borrow a famous example from Stich (1983), someone who believes
that President McKinley was assassinated is expected to believe that President
McKinley is dead. This rational transition between the two beliefs is itself a function
of the inferential link between the concept of assassination that figures as a
constituent of the content of the first belief and the concept of death that is a
constituent of the content of the second belief. Indeed, Mrs T. who claims to
remember that President McKinley was assassinated, but denies knowledge of
whether he is now dead or alive can be diagnosed as lacking mastery of the concept
of assassination.
In short, the argument runs as follows: (1) it is an essential feature of
propositional attitudes that they play a certain inferential role; (2) concepts are the
constituents of the content of these states that are responsible for their playing this
role; hence (3) propositional attitudes in general, and beliefs in particular, have
conceptual content. But if the content of beliefs is by definition conceptual and we
can show that perceptual experience has content that is not fully conceptualizable,
then we will also have shown that perceptual experiences do not reduce to
dispositions to belief. To this task we now turn.
According to the conceptualist approach in the philosophy of perception,
perceptual content is fully conceptual. Against this view, nonconceptualists have
argued that perceptual experiences have a fineness of grain that far outstrips what
can be captured in terms of concepts possessed by the perceiver. The argument from
fineness of grain should not be confused with the argument from richness.6 The
argument from richness of content refers to the putative fact that in perceptual or at
least visual experience we enjoy a richly detailed picture-like representation of the
world around us. Fineness of grain relates to the fact that there are many dimensions
and properties – hue, shape, spatial magnitudes, loudness, pitch, sourness, acridity –
such that any value on that dimension may enter the fine-grained content of an
experience.
To the argument from richness it has been objected that the putative
phenomenological fact on which it is based is actually a ‘grand illusion’ (Noë,
Pessoa, & Thompson, 2000). Recent work in psychology on change blindness,
inattentional blindness and related phenomena seems to call into question the idea
6 One reason this distinction is often overlooked is that the same phrase, namely ‘the analog character of
perceptual content,’ is sometimes used to refer to the fineness of grain of perceptual content, sometimes to
its richness. Thus, while Peacocke (1992) uses the phrase to refer to fineness of grain, Dretske (1981) uses
it to refer to richness.
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that we really enjoy perceptual experiences which represent the environment in rich
detail. Whether and in what sense we should really be skeptical that we really enjoy
such richly detailed visual experiences is at present a hotly debated question.7
However, we won’t go into this debate here, but instead will focus on the argument
from fineness of grain. The argument from fineness of grain and the argument from
richness are independent and the former may hold even if the latter is rejected.
The argument from fineness of grain exploits the idea that we can normally make
perceptual discriminations that are much more fine-grained than the discriminations
for which the subject has corresponding concepts. In other words, perceptual
representations have a fineness of grain that far exceeds what can be captured by
using concepts possessed by the perceiver. One often used illustration of this
phenomenon is that of color discrimination. Normal subjects can perceptually
discriminate many more shades of color than they have concepts for such shades.
The same remark applies to many other properties such as shapes, spatial
magnitudes, sounds, and smells. For instance, to borrow an example from Peacocke:
“If you are looking at a range of mountains, it may be correct to say that you see
some as rounded, some as jagged. But the content of your visual experience with
respect to the shape of the mountains is far more specific than that description
indicates. The description involving the concepts round and jagged would cover
many different fine-grained contents that your experience could have, contents that
are discriminably different from one another” (Peacocke, 1992, pp. 67–68). The
conclusion the nonconceptualists have wanted to draw is that since the range of
discriminable contents perceptual experiences can have goes far beyond the ranges
picked out by concepts in the perceiver’s repertoire, these perceptual contents must
be nonconceptual.
The conceptualist reply to this argument, offered by both McDowell (1994) and
Brewer (1999), is to acknowledge the fine-grainedness of perceptual experience and
yet contend that it can perfectly be captured by appropriate demonstrative concepts.
According to them, the nonconceptualists’ argument rests on an unduly narrow view
of concepts, which restricts the concepts available to capture perceptual discrim-
inations to those associated with verbal expression and having context-independent
norms of application. Once this restriction is lifted, it becomes possible to deny that
a perceiver capable of a perceptual discrimination between, say, two shades of red
for which he lacks correspondingly different context-independent color concepts has
an experience with nonconceptual content. It is perfectly possible for her to capture
this difference in her perceptual experience of the two shades in terms of
demonstrative concepts like colored thus or this shade, that exploit the presence of
samples of the shade in question.
For this strategy to be successful, the conceptualists should demonstrate that the
purported demonstrative observational concepts (DOCs for short) they claim can
capture the fine-grained content of color experience satisfy central criteria of
concepthood and hence really qualify as concepts. Yet, as we will show, their DOCs
fail to meet highly plausible criteria for concepthood that form part of the
conceptualist’s own conception of concepts.8
7 See Noë (2002) for an in-depth investigation of this issue.
8 Some of the arguments in what follows are adapted from Dokic and Pacherie (2001).
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Let us start with some empirical data. There is a wealth of evidence from both
psychophysics and perceptual psychology that our capacity for perceptual
discrimination far surpasses our capacity for perceptual recognition. (Burns &
Ward, 1977; Halsey & Chapanis, 1951; Hardin, 1988; Hurvich, 1981). For instance,
Hardin (1988) points out that although we can discriminate something on the order
of 10 millions colors, when the task is to identify a color in the absence of a
reference standard, even for fairly good observers positive identification is of the
order of about thirty. Quite a drop! To put it vividly, although you may be very good
at discriminating two very similar shades of red when they presented simultaneously,
you are more than likely to be at chance when they are presented in succession and
separated by a mask. The same difference is also found in pitch perception.
Although we can make very fine-grained pitch and interval discriminations, even
trained listeners are not, in general, able to recognize reliably intervals to a finer
degree than chromatic semitones (Raffman, 1995).9
We can now voice our concerns with the conceptualist claim that the content of
perceptual experience can be fully captured in terms of DOCs. First, it seems
plausible to suppose that mastery of an observational concept implies a capacity to
identify and reidentify perceptual instances of the concept. This means that to have a
concept of a perceptually accessible property, one must be able to recognize
instances of the property over time, not just to discriminate between something that
instantiate that property and something that doesn’t. Obviously enough, one can
recognize only what one can remember. But empirical evidence makes it clear that
perceptual memory is limited and its grain much coarser than our perceptual
discrimination thresholds. It follows that if concept possession requires a certain
recognitional capacity, the maximal fineness of grain of our perceptual concepts will
correspond to the maximal fineness of grain of perceptual memory encoding. It is
overwhelmingly unlikely that the conceptualist’s DOCs meet this constraint and
hence are associated with a recognitional capacity.
Of course, the conceptualists could deny that a recognitional requirement should
be imposed on DOCs. Yet there is a price to pay for this move and one may doubt
whether it is worth paying. One important reason for insisting that concept
possession requires an associated identification or recognition capacity has to do
with the inferential role of concepts. As we argued earlier, concepts are plausibly
thought to be what accounts for the inferential powers of our beliefs and other
propositional attitudes. In most cases, what explains the validity of an inference is
the presence of certain conceptual constituents as parts as the content of the
premises. To borrow an example from Crane (1992), a thinker who believes that a is
F and b is F and that a is not b will be disposed to believe that at least two things are
F. What is essential for the inference to be valid is that the same part of the content
9 Persons with absolute pitch may constitute an exception. Yet, it is estimated about 3% of the general
population in Europe have absolute pitch and this figure only increases to about 8% in professional or
semi-professional musicians. Furthermore, it seems that the ability exists either from early childhood or
not at all. Although with considerable effort and extensive training an adult can acquire perform at a level
that is close to that of persons with absolute pitch, this painfully acquired skill turns out to be quite fragile,
i.e., it gets rapidly lost when practicing on tone recognition is terminated (Terhardt, 2000).
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should occur in the first two premises, in other words they should both contain the
concept F. But in the absence of any genuine recognitional capacity associated with
DOCs, how are we to ensure that the same DOC figures in both premises? The only
case in which such insurance can be given is when the two premises are
simultaneously available to the thinker in perceptual experience in such a way that
he can attend to both at once. As soon as the two premises are obtained separately,
the warrant disappears, since, for lack of recognitional capacity, the thinker will not
be in a position to ascertain whether the DOCs involved in the two premises are the
same or different. The inferential potential of such concepts is therefore extremely
restricted. These concepts have neither past nor future and their use in reasoning is
confined to the here and now of perceptual experience.
So far we have argued that lack of diachronic recognition for DOCs severely
limits the inferential potential of demonstrative judgements involving them and
seriously threatens the conceptualists’ claim that they are genuine concepts. But the
worse is still to come for even synchronic recognition is problematic.
According to a plausible Criterion of Difference, two concepts (considered as the
senses of predicates) are different if the subject who grasps them at the same time
can rationally adopt different epistemic attitudes toward thoughts containing them
(which are otherwise identical). For instance, if it is possible for a rational subject to
believe (in a particular context) that everything which is thusa is thusa, where both
tokens of ‘thusa’ express the same DOC grounded on the perception of a, while not
believing that everything which is thusa is thusb, where the token ‘thusb’ expresses a
DOC grounded on the perception of b, then the concept expressed by ‘thusa’ is not
the same as the concept expressed as ‘thusb.’ The Criterion of Difference for
concepts implies that if a subject grasps two concepts at the same time, she is at least
sometimes in a position to know that the concepts are different. That is, if she can
rationally adopt different epistemic attitudes toward certain thoughts containing
them, she knows that they are different.
It is a well-known fact that perceptual indiscriminability is non-transitive. For
instance, color samples (or pitches) a, b, and c can be found such that, for a normal
observer, b is indiscriminable from a and c is indiscriminable from b and yet c is
discriminable from a. Now suppose that a subject, who is aware of this empirical
fact, perceives two samples of the same color shade – say, a1 and a2. It is natural to
suppose that the DOCs grounded on the perception of these samples are the same.
After all, not only do they seem to be colored exactly alike, but they really have the
same color shade. However, it seems always possible for the subject to believe that
everything which is thusa1 is thusa1, while doubting whether everything which is
thusa1 is thusa2. For all she knows on the basis of perceptual appearance, there might
be a sample that is indiscriminable from a2 but discriminable from a1. Such a sample
would fall under thusa2 but not under thusa1. This is a coherent epistemic possibility,
which implies, according to the Criterion of Difference, that ‘thusa1’ and ‘thusa2’
express different concepts (in this context).
If we accept the Criterion of Difference for concepts, then, it seems impossible to
grasp the same DOC through the perception of numerically distinct objects that look
exactly the same as far as their most specific color is concerned (or, mutatis
mutandis, through the perception of distinct auditory events that sound exactly the
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same as far as their pitch is concerned). In fact, there is an infinite number of DOCs
for a given shade or pitch, since DOCs are necessarily tied to particular samples. So
either conceptualists admit that there are conceptual differences in the contents of
perception which do not correspond to any phenomenological differences, or they
slice the phenomenal world too finely. Beside the fact that neither option is
intrinsically plausible, the normal experience of perceiving internal relations between
different shades presented at a given time (for instance, perceiving that two samples
have exactly the same shade or two sounds the same pitch) has not been provided
for.
Thus, DOCs have implausible conditions of individuation and violate an intuitive
Criterion of Difference for concepts. Moreover, they are not associated with
recognitional capacities and their inferential potential is severely restricted. We
conclude we are left with no reason to admit that DOCs qualify as concepts. Let us
make clear, however, that we do not deny the coherence of context-dependent
classifications. On the contrary, a judgement expressed by ‘That is thus’ in a given
context can have a fully conceptual content. What we claim is that although such a
content is based on the perception of things and their qualities, it cannot substitute
for the content of perceptual experience itself. The modes of presentation expressed
by demonstrative predicates like ‘is thus’ cannot both satisfy the essential constraints
on the individuation of concepts and capture the phenomenology of perceptual
experience. So the content of perceptual experience cannot be fully captured by
concepts, even if we allow for conceptual, context-dependent classifications of
things.
The relevance of the foregoing discussion to the evaluation of Dennett’s
doxological commitment is rather obvious. The fineness of grain of our perceptual
experiences makes an essential contribution to what it is like to enjoy them. Our
point about diachronic recognition is that phenomenal beliefs cannot constitute the
whole of what it is like to have perceptual experiences. There are phenomenal
differences which cannot be captured at the level of beliefs, at least if beliefs are
partly defined in terms of an inferential network of beliefs. Moreover, these
differences can be manifested in controlled behavior, which makes them accessible
in principle using the methods of heterophenomenology.
The point about diachronic recognition is prima facie compatible with the claim
that our phenomenal beliefs cannot be false. What it shows is just that they cannot
provide a complete description of what it is like to have experiences. Our discussion
of synchronic recognition goes a step further. Blind adherence to the doxological
commitment runs the risk of slicing the phenomenal world too finely. So if our
phenomenal beliefs were really constitutive of what they describe, our phenomenal
world would be very different from the one we actually live in. This comes close to
being a reductio of Dennett’s commitment.
Some final considerations. One might object that our criteria of concepthood are
too stringent. Noë (2004) has argued that the sensori-motor skills that enable us to
experience sensory qualities should already be considered as conceptual (or “proto-
conceptual”). In our view, sensori-motor skills cannot ground by themselves
concepts that are sophisticated enough to play a substantial role in inferences.
However, perhaps the issue is at least partly terminological. Suppose Noë is right
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and the content of perceptual experience is conceptual in a loose sense of the term.
Then our claim should be rephrased as the claim that some conceptual contents
cannot be the contents of beliefs and other high-level propositional attitudes.
Perception would have a conceptual content, but one which is not substantive
enough to support full-blown inferential interactions with the contents of genuine
propositional attitudes. The gist of our criticism of Dennett’s doxological com-
mitment would be unaffected.
Alternatively, one might object that our criteria of beliefhood are too stringent.
Dennett might allow that perceptual discrimination involves a rather cognitively
primitive form of belief, one which is not necessarily associated with recognitional
and reidentification capacities. Once again, the issue would seem to be purely
terminological. But some terminologies are more perspicuous than others. The term
‘belief’ would label mental states with radically different functional roles and would
loose most of its theoretical usefulness.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have put forward two arguments which cast doubt on Dennett’s
claim that our phenomenal beliefs are somehow constitutive of what they are about,
including what it is like to have conscious perceptual experiences of the world. First,
a coherent account of consciousness can motivate a threefold theoretical distinction
between unconscious experiences, conscious experiences, and awareness of
conscious experiences. Second, conscious perceptual experiences have contents
which cannot be fully captured at the level of beliefs. Both arguments are compatible
with materialism, and neither introduces dubious mental intermediaries between
mind and world. Our opinion is that they put Dennett’s insights about the relevance
of heterophenomenology to the study of consciousness in a much better light.
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